[27] Quare optima? quia quod restat incertum est. Quare optima? quia iuvenes possumus discere, possumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad meliora convertere; quia hoc tempus idoneum est laboribus, idoneum agitandis perstudia ingeniis [est] et exercendis per opera corporibus: quod superest segnius et languidius est et propius a fine. Itaque toto hoc agamus animoet omissis ad quae devertimur in rem unam laboremus, ne hanc temporis pernicissimi celeritatem, quam retinere non possumus, relicti demum intellegamus. Primus quisque tamquam optimus dies placeat et redigatur in nostrum.

[11] Et paucorum versuum liber est et quidem laudandus atque utilis: annales Tanusii scis quam ponderosi sint et quid vocentur. Hoc est vita quorundam longa, et quod Tanusii sequitur annales.

Sons are no help, nor a father, nor relations; there is no help from kinsfolk for one whom death has seized.

[3] Repeto memoria quam magno animo quaedam verba proieceris, quanti roboris plena: gratulatus sum protinus mihi et dixi, 'non a summis labris ista venerunt, habent hae voces fundamentum; iste homo non est unus e populo, ad salutem spectat'.

[19] Quid enim, oro te, liberale habent isti ieiuni vomitores, quorum corpora in sagina, animi in macie et veterno sunt? An liberale studium istuc esse iuventuti nostrae credimus, quam maiores nostri rectam exercuerunt hastilia iacere, sudem torquere, equum agitare, arma tractare? Nihil liberos suos docebant quod discendum esset iacentibus. Sed nec hae nec illae docent aluntve virtutem; quid enim prodest equum regere et cursum eius freno temperare, adfectibus effrenatissimis abstrahi? quid prodest multos vincere luctatione vel caestu, ab iracundia vinci?

[6] Quid expectas? nulli sapere casu obtigit. Pecunia veniet ultro, honor offeretur, gratia ac dignitas fortasse ingerentur tibi: virtus in te non incidet. Ne levi quidem opera aut parvo labore cognoscitur; sed est tanti laborare omnia bona semel occupaturo. Unum est enim bonum quod honestum: in illis nihil invenies veri, nihil certi, quaecumque famae placent.

[39] 'At non apud omnis proficiunt.' Ne philosophia quidem; nec ideo inutilis et formandis animis inefficax est. Quid autem? philosophia non vitae lex est? Sed putemus non proficere leges: non ideo sequitur ut ne monitiones quidem proficiant. Aut sic et consolationes nega proficere dissuasionesque et adhortationes et obiurgationes et laudationes. Omnia ista monitionum genera sunt; per ista ad perfectum animi statum pervenitur.

[21] Quod vides istos sequi qui aut vellunt barbam aut intervellunt, qui labra pressius tondent et adradunt servata et summissa cetera parte, qui lacernas coloris inprobi sumunt, qui perlucentem togam, qui nolunt facere quicquam quod hominum oculis transire liceat: inritant illos et in se avertunt, volunt vel reprehendi dum conspici. Talis est oratio Maecenatis omniumque aliorum qui non casu errant sed scientes volentesque.

Consider the past; such great changes of political supremacies. Thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should deviate from the order of the things which take place now: accordingly to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?

Vanité. — Qu’une chose aussi visible qu’est la vanité du monde soit si peu connue que ce soit une chose étrange et surprenante de dire que c’est une sottise de chercher les grandeurs, cela est admirable !

Moïse d’abord enseigne la trinité, le péché originel, le Messie. David, grand témoin : roi, bon, pardonnant, belle âme, bon esprit, puissant ; il prophétise, et son miracle arrive ; cela est infini. Il n’avait qu’à dire qu’il était le Messie, s’il eût eu de la vanité : car les prophéties sont plus claires de lui que de Jésus-Christ. Et saint Jehan de même.

He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things that are; and things that are have a relation to all things that come into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth, and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is equally affected—for it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards both—towards these they who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honour and dishonour, which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are produced in continuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a certain original movement of Providence, according to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, having conceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and having determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of suchlike successions.

[10] Si habemus alios amicos, male de iis et meremur et existimamus, qui parum valent in unius elati solacium; si non habemus, maiorem iniuriam ipsi nobis fecimus quam a fortuna accepimus: illa unum abstulit, nos quemcumque non fecimus.

Les fleuves de Babylone coulent, et tombent et entraînent. Ô sainte Sion, où tout est stable et où rien ne tombe ! Il faut s’asseoir sur les fleuves, non sous ou dedans, mais dessus ; et non debout, mais assis : pour être humble, étant assis, et en sûreté, étant dessus. Mais nous serons debout dans les porches de Hiérusalem. Qu’on voie si ce plaisir est stable ou coulant : s’il passe, c’est un fleuve de Babylone.

A poor Man had a wooden Image of a god, to which he used to pray daily for riches. He did this for a long time, but remained as poor as ever, till one day he caught up the Image in disgust and hurled it with all his strength against the wall. The force of the blow split open the head and a quantity of gold coins fell out upon the floor. The Man gathered them up greedily, and said, “O you old fraud, you! When I honoured you, you did me no good whatever: but no sooner do I treat you to insults and violence than you make a rich man of me!”

Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear: for where we are able to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds according to our constitution, there no harm is to be suspected.

Prophéties. — Le sceptre ne fut point interrompu par la captivité de Babylone, à cause que le retour était promis et prédit.

Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those affects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the opinion that it is either good or bad.

Deux choses instruisent l’homme de toute sa nature : l’instinct et l’expérience.

[11] Deinde, si das aliquid iuris tristitiae, timori, cupiditati, ceteris motibus pravis, non erunt in nostra potestate. Quare? quia extra nos sunt quibus inritantur; itaque crescent prout magnas habuerint minoresve causas quibus concitentur. Maior erit timor, si plus quo exterreatur aut propius aspexerit, acrior cupiditas quo illam amplioris rei spes evocaverit.